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Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia: An Out of Tune
Definition of "Employee" Keeps Freelance Musicians
from Being Covered by Title VII
Jeff Clement1
I. INTRODUCTION
Should individuals classified as employees have standing to sue
while individuals classified as independent contractors have no stand-
ing to sue under remedial statutes like Title VII? The Supreme Court
has clearly said "yes."' 2 Despite the broad legislative intent of Title
VII, courts have decided that Title VII and other federal employment
discrimination laws do not protect independent contractors.3 There-
fore, courts have grappled with determining who is an employee, cov-
ered under federal discrimination statutes, and who is an independent
contractor, not covered under federal discrimination statutes.
The exclusion of an entire category of workers from statutes such as
Title VII leaves many workers, who have been discriminated against,
with no remedy under Title VII.4 An overly narrow definition of em-
ployee can have the same effect. Such classifications are particularly
damaging to employees in less conventional fields. A case that exem-
plifies this is Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia,5 which involved
freelance symphony musicians. The Lerohl court followed the current
narrow test of employment status enunciated by the Supreme Court in
1. J.D. from DePaul University College of Law expected 2005; M.B.A. from DePaul Univer-
sity Kellstadt School of Business expected 2005; Florida State University, B.S., 2002.
2. See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 320-321 (1992).
3. See generally Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The
Case for Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contrac-
tors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239 (1997).
4. However, such workers can still sue under tort law assuming there is a valid claim. David
L. Gregory, The Problematic Employment Dynamics of Student Internships, 12 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 227, 229 n.9 (1998). Further, individuals also sometimes seek relief
under 42. U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"). However, the statute prohibits discrimination only on
the basis of face or ethnicity, excluding claims on other grounds such as sex. Yamada, 38 B.C. L.
REV. at 256.
5. Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 2003).
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Reid6 to hold that the musicians in the case were not employees but
independent contractors. 7
The purpose of this note is to argue that the Lerohl decision was
incorrectly decided because it used a definition of employee that is
overly narrow for a Title VII discrimination case. Part II of this note
will analyze the history of the various tests that have been used by
courts to determine whether an individual is an employee. Then, Part
III and IV of this note will outline the Lerohl case and analyze the
decision's strengths and weaknesses. Finally, Part V of this paper will
suggest that the legislature specifically include independent contrac-
tors as being covered under Title VII.
II. BACKGROUND
Section 2000e-2 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohib-
its discrimination in the employment setting against any individual on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.8 Despite the
broad language of Title VII, there are several hurdles that a plaintiff
must overcome. One of the hurdles involves a determination of
whether the plaintiff is an employee under Title VII.
A. Definition of Employee
In order to bring a Title VII discrimination claim, a plaintiff must
first have standing to sue under Title VII. A plaintiff achieves stand-
ing by showing that an employer-employee relationship exists. Basi-
cally, this means that the plaintiff must be an employee of the
employer in order to be covered by Title VII.9 Under Title VII, an
employee is defined as an individual employed by an employer. 10
6. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
7. Id. at 489. The Reid test is basically the common-law agency test as discussed later in this
article. See infra Part II.G.1. This test considers the hiring party's right to control the manner
and means by which the product is accomplished and several additional factors. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1964). This section provides that "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
9. Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that
"Title VII... covers employees not independent contractors").
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)(1964). According to Title VII, "the term 'employee' means an indi-
vidual employed by an employer, except that the term 'employee' shall not include any person
elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters
thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an ap-
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Since this definition provides little guidance, courts have grappled
with the issue of determining employee status.
B. Independent Contractor as Distinct from Employee
It is now well established that Title VII protects employees, but not
individuals classified as independent contractors.1' Originally, the dis-
tinction between employees and independent contractors was neces-
sary to determine if an employer was to be held liable for injuries its
employees caused to third parties under the concept of vicarious lia-
bility. 12 However, the distinction has been applied with equal force to
claims involving Title VII and other acts regulating employment rela-
tionships.13 The ways in which courts have made this employee/inde-
pendent contractor determination have varied drastically. Various
tests have come in and out of favor over the years.
C. The Common Law Test of Employee
Originally, some courts adopted the common law agency test to de-
termine whether an individual was an employee. The basic inquiry of
this test determines whether the employer had the right to control the
manner and means of the individual's work performance.1 4 For exam-
ple, in Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co.,' 5 the court used the common law
pointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the
constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence
shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental
agency or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term
includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States. Id.
11. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The Case for Amend-
ing Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L.
REV 239, 240 (1997); Elizabeth Flagg, Insurance Agents Slip Through the "Good Hands" of ER-
ISA; "Employee" Defined by Agency Principles in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v.
Darden, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1099, 1106-1107 (1993).
12. See Elizabeth Flagg, Insurance Agents Slip Through the "Good Hands" of ERISA; "Em-
ployee" Defined by Agency Principles in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden, 28
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1099, 1106-1109 (1993) (discussing the roots of the employee/indepen-
dent contractor distinction for purposes of vicarious liability determinations); see also Nancy E.
Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM & MARY L. REV.
75, 96 (1984) (stating that the concept of independent contractor as distinct for an employee
emerged as a limitation on vicarious liability based upon policy considerations of fairness to
employers and the assurance that the independent contractor could assume his or her own
liability).
13. See, e.g., Mallare v. St. Luke's Hospital of Bethlehem, 699 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (making an employment status determination for Title VII purposes); Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (making an employee determination for
ERISA purposes).
14. Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 829, 831-832 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co.,
410 F. Supp. 513, 519 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
15. Smith, 410 F. Supp at 519.
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right to control test to hold that a plaintiff working through a subhaul-
ing agreement was not covered by Title VII because she was not an
employee. 16 The court stated that the "right to control" factor had
not been satisfied because the plaintiff and her husband maintained
their own supplies and had contracted only for as long as was required
to do a specific job.17 Further, the fact that the plaintiff received an
hourly rate, was directed to the jobsite, and was requested to arrive
and depart at specified times did not transform the plaintiff into an
employee. 18 However, most courts did not adopt the common law
test, instead preferring methods that took into consideration more
than merely the "right to control" factor.19 These approaches are de-
tailed below.
D. Hearst and Silk Test: Mischief to Be Corrected
One of the more interesting developments in litigation regarding
the definition of employee occurred in a series of cases in the 1940's.
These cases rejected the common law "right to control" test and in-
stead interpreted the term employee based on the statutory purpose
or mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.20
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,21 the Supreme Court deter-
mined whether newsboys were employees under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).22 Instead of adopting the common law ap-
proach, the Court adopted a significantly more liberal construction of
the term employee. The Court stated that the word "employee" is
not treated by Congress as a word of art having a definite meaning.
Rather it takes color from its surroundings in the statute where it
appears, and derives meaning from the context of that statute,
which must be read in the light of the mischief to be corrected and
the end to be attained. 23
Under this test, statutory purpose could outweigh rigid legal
classifications.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 516-517.
18. Id. at 517.
19. Maltby, Beyond Economic Realities, 38 B.C. L. REV. at 248 (stating that during the late
1970s and early 1980s, most courts adopted either the economic realities test, or more frequently,
a hybrid test).
20. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944);
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
21. NLRB, 322 U.S. 111.
22. Id. at 113.
23. Id. at 124.
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This reasoning was also applied in United States v. Silk.24 This time,
the case involved an employee determination under the Social Secur-
ity Act (SSA). 25 The Court decided to apply the same rule as was
applied in the Hearst case based on the idea of statutory purpose.2 6
Congress responded to cases like Hearst and Silk by amending
those statutes that it felt should have a restrictive definition of em-
ployee.2 7 For example, Congress amended the NLRA to exclude in-
dependent contractors.28 Further, Congress amended the SSA to
require the use of the common law test to determine employee sta-
tus. 29 The effect of this amendment was to invalidate the Silk deci-
sion. By contrast, Congress did not amend all statutes to which the
Hearst analysis had been applied. For example, Congress did not
amend the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),30 even though the
Hearst analysis had been used in Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., a
case involving the FLSA.31
E. The Economic Realities Test
The economic realities test is somewhat of an outgrowth of the
broad construction of the term employee applied in Hearst. However,
this test provides more guidance for courts. The economic realities
test focuses on the balance of power in the employment relationship. 32
Under the economic realities test, courts examine the underlying eco-
nomic realities of the relationship including whether the employer has
the ability to control access to employment opportunities and whether
the employee is economically dependent on the employer.33 Control
of employment opportunities is the key to the economic realities
test.34 This test was adopted by some courts that focused on the broad
remedial purpose of acts like Title VII.35
24. Silk, 331 U.S. 704.
25. Id. at 705.
26. Id. at 713-714.
27. Valerie L. Jacobson, Bringing a Title VII Action: Which Test Regarding Standing to Sue is
Most Applicable?, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 95, 103 (1990); Dowd, The Test of Employee Status, 26
WM & MARY L. REV. at 92.
28. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status, 26 WM & MARY L. REV. at 92.
29. Id. at 92-93.
30. Id.
31. Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947).
32. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 102.
33. Id. at 102; Maltby, Beyond Economic Realities, 38 B.C. L. REv. at 249.
34. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 112.
35. Maltby, 38. B.C. L. REV. at 248.
2005]
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For example, in Lilley v. BTM Corp.,3 6 the plaintiff, a salesman,
brought an action alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA).37 The court stated that the term
employee should be given a broad construction in order to effectuate
the remedial purpose of the ADEA.38 The court then applied the ec-
onomic realities test, which it described as looking to whether the "pu-
tative employee is economically dependent upon the principal or is
instead in business for himself. ' 39 The court ultimately held that the
salesman qualified as an employee.40
However, the economic realities test has not always been applied
with great consistency. Some courts have claimed to be applying the
economic realities test while in practice the court applied the hybrid
approach described below. For example, in Broussard v. L.H. Bossier,
Inc.,41 the court applied the economic realities test to a Title VII claim
by a woman truck driver. The facts of the case were almost identical
to the earlier Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co. case in that both involved a
separate truck hauling company that the plaintiffs co-owned with their
husbands.4 2 However, in this case, the court stated that the economic
realities test should guide the analysis of whether an individual is an
employee under Title VII.4 3
Despite formally adopting the economic realities test, the Broussard
court ultimately came to the same conclusion as the Smith court.
44
The court did this by focusing on factors more in line with the com-
mon-law test and hybrid test like the "right to control. 45 Therefore,
the plaintiff was found to not be an employee under Title VII because
the control factor was not satisfied. 46 Decisions like Broussard show
that the economic realities test, which should emphasize the plaintiff's
economic dependence on the employer, is often misapplied in favor of
applying the traditional common-law control inquiry.
36. Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1992).
37. Id. at 749.
38. Id. at 750.
39. Id. at 750.
40. Id. at 756.
41. Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1986).
42. Compare Id. at 1159, with Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp at 519.
43. Broussard, 789 F.2d at 1160.
44. Id. at 1161 (holding that Broussard was not an employee for Title VII purposes).
45. Id. at 1160. The Court stated that under the economic realities test, the right to control is
the most important factor in determining employee status. Id. However, the court provided no
authority for this proposition, instead citing to Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., which applied the
common-law test instead of the economic realities test.
46. Id. at 1160.
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F. Hybrid Test,
The test most often applied for Title VII purposes is the hybrid
test.47 The hybrid test is a combination of the common-law right to
control test and the economic realities test. However, the right to
control factor is most heavily weighed in the hybrid test.48
Mallare v. St. Luke's Hospital of Bethlehem49 involved a Title VII
claim brought by plaintiff physician.50 The court stated that the
proper standard to apply in the determination of employment status is
the hybrid standard, which takes into account the economic realities
of the situation, but focuses On the employer's right to control the
employee. 51 The court stated that while the hospital may not have
had control in the sense of supervision over the physician, ultimate
control can be exercised by a hospital since privileges can be with-
drawn if a doctor's performance does not comport with hospital stan-
dards.52 Regarding the economic realities of the situation, the court
stated that the physician's practice depended upon access to the hospi-
tal for his patients.5 3 Therefore, the court denied the hospital's mo-
tion for summary judgment on the issue of employment status.5 4
Despite the more worker-favorable outcome present in Mallare, ap-
plication of the hybrid test usually results in a holding that the plaintiff
was not an employee because the "right to control" factor is given the
greatest weight. For example, in Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Zippo Manufacturing Co. 5 the plaintiff, a district
manager and distributor of Zippo products, was found to not be an
employee because of Zippo's lack of control over the managers. 56
The court emphasized the fact that the managers could choose the
business form of their choice and set their own hours.57  Therefore,
47. See Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc. 673 F.2d 337, 341 (11th Cir. 1982); Fields v. Hallsville lde-
pendent School Dist. 906 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1990); Wilde v. Country of Kandiyohi, 811 F.
Supp. 446, 451 (D. Minn. 1993); Mallare v. St. Luke's Hospital of Bethlehem, 699 F. Supp. 1127,
1129 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
48. Wilde, 811 F. Supp at 451 (stating that the extent of the employer's right to control the
worker is the most telling factor.).
49. Mallare v. St. Luke's Hospital of Bethlehem, 699 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
50. Mallare, 699 F. Supp at 1128.
51. Id. at 1129.
52. Id. at 1130.
53. Id. In this case, the physician was in a medical residency program in Obstetrics/Gynecol-
ogy. Id. at 1128.
54. Id. at 1130.
55. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Zippo Manufacturing Co., 713 F.2d 32
(3rd Cir. 1983).
56. Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, 713 F.2d at 33.
57. Id.
2005]
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any economic dependence the managers may have had on Zippo was
overcome by the "right to control" factor.5 8
G. Significant Recent Supreme Court Cases
Two recent Supreme Court cases, Reid59 and Darden,60 have set the
standard by which most courts determine the definition of employee
today. The basis of the modern test is an analysis of several factors,
none of which are given greater weight than the others.
1. The Reid Case
The Reid case involved an interpretation of the "work made for
hire" provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976.61 It was necessary to
determine whether Reid's sculpture was "a work prepared by an em-
ployee within the scope of his or her employment" in order to decide
whether the "work for hire" provision applied. Like Title VII, the Act
did not define the term employee. 62 The Court stated that in the past
when Congress used the term employee without defining it, the con-
ventional master-servant relationship as understood by common law
agency principles has been applied. 63
Applying agency principles, the Court stated that in determining
whether the plaintiff is an employee, the Court should consider the
hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished. 64 Further, several factors are relevant to
achieving this inquiry. These factors include the following:
(1) the skill required
(2) the source of the instrumentalities and tools
(3) the location of the work
(4) the duration of the relationship between the parties
(5) whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party
58. Id. at 38 (stating "even if appellants were required to sell only Zippo products, and even if
they were economically dependent on the income they earned as Zippo DMs (district manag-
ers), these factors are not sufficient to establish that they were employees when balanced against
the other factors that tend to establish their status as independent contractors."). Id.
59. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
60. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
61. Reid, 490 U.S. at 732.
62. Id. at 738. The term "scope of employment" was also not defined. Id.
63. Id. at 739-740 citing Kelley v. Southern Pacific Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322-323 (1974); Baker v.
Texas v. Pacific R. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959); Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 237 U.S.
84, 94 (1915). The Court stated that "where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled
meaning under the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms." Id. at 739.
64. Id. at 751.
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(6) the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how
long to work
(7) the method of payment
(8) the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants
(9) whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring
party
(10) whether the hiring party is in business
(11) the provision of employee benefits
(12) the tax treatment of the hired party.65
However, unlike the hybrid test, the Court stated that no one of
these factors is determinative. 66 Applying these factors, the Court
concluded that Reid was an independent contractor as opposed to an
employee. 67
2. The Darden Case
The Darden case concerned the definition of employee under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).68 According to
the Court, since ERISA's definition of employee was merely nominal
in nature, it was appropriate to adopt the same common law standard
as in Reid.69
Interestingly, the Court in Darden took the opportunity to state that
the Hearst and Silk cases should not be followed as precedent.70 The
Court said that both cases were "feeble precedents" because after
both cases expanded the definition of employee for their respective
statutes, Congress responded by amending those statutes to demon-
strate that the common law definition should be applied. 71
The Supreme Court's decisions in Reid and Darden are strong sig-
nals that the common law test has returned. According to some com-
mentators, "many recent decisions have interpreted Darden as
requiring application of the common-law test to Title VII and ADEA
65. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-752. Most of these factors were borrowed from the Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 220. For example, the Restatement lists factors such as control, the skill
required, and the length of time for which the person is employed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2)(a)-(j).
66. Id. at 752.
67. Id. at 752. Unlike most of the cases analyzed in this note, this determination was actually
beneficial to Reid, since now Reid would be considered the owner of the copyright in his work.
68. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 320-321. The Court stated that Darden's ERISA claim can succeed
only if he was Nationwide's "employee." Id.
69. Id. at 323. According to the Court, "ERISA'S nominal definition of employee... is com-
pletely circular and explains nothing... Thus we adopt a common-law test for determining who
qualifies as an employee under ERISA." Id.
70. Id. at 324-325.
71. Id.
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claims, even if the courts had previously applied either the economic
realities or hybrid test."'72 One decision that applies the Reid and
Darden rationale to Title V11 is the subject opinion of this note.
III. SUBJECr OPINION: THE LEROHL CASE
Lehrol v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia73 is one of the most recent
cases to deal with the definition of employee. Tricia Lerohl, a French
horn player, filed suit against the Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, a
nonprofit corporation that governs the Minnesota Sinfonia.74 Lerohl
claimed that she was terminated from the Sinfonia in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
75
The Minnesota Sinfonia, an outgrowth of the Minneapolis Chamber
Symphony Orchestra, puts on free classical music concerts. 76 Fishman
conducts the Sinfonia and acts as the Sinfonia's executive and artistic
director.77 The musicians playing in the Sinfonia are all freelance mu-
sicians; however, all Sinfonia players are members of Local 30-73 of
the American Federation of Musicians. 78 The freelance musicians that
are most often invited to play in the concerts are termed as "regular"
players.79 Although players may opt out of Sinfonia concerts, Fish-
man's policy is that a musician must accept the vast majority of work
offered in order to retain "regular" player status.
80
The Sinfonia players are paid on a per-concert basis at the union
scale. Also, the Sinfonia contributes an agreed percentage of the
union scale payments to the musician's union pension fund.81 How-
ever, the Sinfonia does not withhold income or taxes and does not
provide any additional fringe benefits.
82
72. Maltby, Beyond "Economic Realities", 38 B.C. L. REV. at 253.
73. Lehrol v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486 (8th Cir. 2003).
74. Id. at 487. The Court of Appeal's decision deals simultaneously with a claim by Shelley
Hanson, another freelance player in the Sinfonia. Hanson brought suit under the American with
Disabilities Act, claiming that the Sinfonia violated the ADA when it stopped hiring her after
being absent for several months while recovering from work-related injuries. This note will fo-
cus on Lerohl's Title VII claim; however, the Court of Appeal's applies an identical analysis to
both claims. Id. at 487-489.
75. Id at 487.
76. Id. at 488.
77. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 488.
78. Id. at 488. The jurisdiction of Local 30-73 of the American Federation of Musicians covers
several counties in Minnesota and Wisconsin. It is also known as the "Twin Cities Musicians
Union." For more information, see http://www.afm.org/30-73/ and http://www.tcmu.com.
79. Id.
80. Id. In order to opt out, musicians had to give two weeks notice and arrange for an eligible
substitute to perform. Id.
81. Id. at 488-489.
82. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 488.
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Lerohl, a "regular" player at Sinfonia concerts from 1990 to 1999,
claimed that the Sinfonia stopped offering work to her in retaliation
for her complaints about sexual harassment by Fishman. 83 She argued
that her termination was a violation of Title VII. 84 The district court
dismissed her complaint, holding that Lerohl was an independent con-
tractor outside the protection of Title VII.85
The Court of Appeals affirmed, and in doing so adopted the Reid
and Darden test for employment status.86 Citing the Darden case
from the Supreme Court, the Lerohl Court stated that the general
common law of agency should be applied to determine whether a
hired party is an employee or an independent contractor.87 Further,
the court ruled that the Reid factors should be considered in this anal-
ysis. The court stated:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the gen-
eral common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to
control the manner and means by which the product is accom-
plished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the
skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the loca-
tion of the work; the duration of the relationship between the par-
ties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion
over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part
of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party
is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treat-
ment of the hiring party.88
The court particularly emphasized that no one of these factors is de-
terminative. 89 The court stated that all of the incidents of the relation-
ship must be assessed and weighed. 90 Interestingly, the court
acknowledged that the economic aspects of the parties' relationship
may be considered; however, this inquiry is to be confined to the dis-
trict court.91
83. Id. at 489.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 488.
86. Id.
87. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 489.
88. Id. at 489 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-752
(1989).)
89. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 489.
90. Id. The court stated that the inquiry required more "than simply tallying factors on each
side and selecting the winner on the basis of a point score." Id.
91. Id.
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Lerohl claimed that the "right to control" factor should be given
primary consideration. 92 Lerohl argued that since Fishman, as con-
ductor, "controlled" the rehearsals and concerts, all of the Sinfonia
musicians were employees. 93 The court strongly rejected Lerohl's reli-
ance on the "right to control" factor, instead emphasizing that no one
factor is determinative. 94
The court acknowledged that it was treading in new waters, noting
that there were surprisingly few cases dealing with whether musicians
who played in a band or orchestra were employees.95 One case that
the court found to be relevant was Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 96 where
the Seattle Opera's auxiliary choristers were held to be employees of
the Opera. However, the court stated that it found the dissent in the
Seattle Opera case to be more persuasive.97 Further, the court
pointed to the Florida Gulf Coast Symphony case, 98 which was de-
cided prior to the Reid or Darden decisions. The Florida Gulf Coast
Symphony case applied the common-law test to determine whether
musicians were employees of their orchestra.99 The Florida Gulf
Coast Symphony Court held that the musicians were independent con-
tractors because they were engaged in a distinct occupation and re-
ceived the bulk of their income from other sources. 100
Using this information and applying the Reid factors, the court held
that Lerohl was an independent contractor. 101 First, the court stated
that Sinfonia musicians are highly skilled professionals who supply
their own instruments.'0 2 Also, the court claimed that Lerohl and Sin-
fonia musicians chose to remain "free-lance" instead of joining an
orchestra.'0 3 The court also noted that the Sinfonia withheld no in-
92. Id. at 490. The court mentioned the "control theory urged by Lerohl."
93. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 490.
94. Id. (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 325-326 and Reid, 490 U.S. at 750-751.)
95. Id.
96. Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
97. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 490.
98. Florida Gulf Coast Symphony v. Dep't of Labor & Employment Sec., 386 So. 2d 259 (Fla.
App. 1980).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 264. The court also emphasized that the musicians spent more than two-thirds of
their time in activities over which petitioner had no control and supplied their own instruments.
Id.
101. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 491-493.
102. Id. at 491.
103. Id. The court likened the situation to lawyers, accountants, and business consultants who
choose private practice instead of "in-house" employment. Id.
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come or FICA taxes, and provided no employee benefits to Sinfonia
musicians. 104
The most relevant part of the court's decision, however, dealt with
the court's construction of the "right to control" factor. The court
stated that the relevant control issue is not whether Fishman con-
trolled the musicians' performance, but whether Sinfonia musicians
retained the right to decline particular Sinfonia concerts and play else-
where.' 0 5 Applying the "right to retain" factor, the court held that
Lerohl and other "regular" Sinfonia musicians retained the right to
accept or reject playing a particular concert. 10 6 Therefore, Lerohl was
an independent contractor and without a remedy under Title VII.107
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Decision in Lerohl Was Incorrect
This note argues that the Lerohl decision was incorrect. First, the
court should have applied the hybrid test to the facts of the case in-
stead of the Reid test.108 Second, the court mistakenly emphasized the
"right to retain" factor in coming to its conclusion that Lerohl and the
Sinfonia musicians were not employees. 0 9 Next, the court's decision
was incorrect because it contradicts a prior determination of the em-
ployment status of symphony musicians.110 Further, this note will ar-
gue that the Reid test is inappropriate for Title VII claims because of
the broad purpose and scope of Title VII. Finally, the "Reid factors"
are unfair when applied to symphony musicians.
1. The Hybrid Test Is the Appropriate Test for Title VII Claims
The appropriate test for Title VII claims is the hybrid test. Some
cases have taken the Reid and Darden cases as applying to all employ-
ment status determinations."' However, there is no express language
104. Id. at 492. Tax treatment and benefits are both Reid factors. The court gave these factors
significant attention adding that "every case since Reid that has applied the common-law test has
found the hired party to be an independent contractor where the hiring party failed to extend
benefits or pay social security taxes. Id.
105. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 491.
106. Id. at 492. Further, the court stated that musicians were even allowed to back out of
concerts that they already agreed to perform at. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-752 (1989).
109. See Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 491.
110. See Seattle Opera v. NLRB, which held that auxiliary choristers were employees of the
Opera. Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
111. Maltby, Beyond "Economic Realities", 38 B.C. L. REV. at 253.
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in either the Reid or Darden cases that their rationale should be ap-
plied to Title VII claims. 112
On the other hand, there are multiple cases applying the hybrid test
to Title VII claims.113 For example, in Wilde v. Count of Kandiyohi,1 4
the court stated that "nearly every appellate court has applied a test
described as a hybrid of the common-law test and the economic reali-
ties test."1 15 Further, many Title VII cases decided after Reid and
Darden have continued to use a hybrid test. For example, in Eisen-
berg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc.,116 decided in 2000, the
court stated that the greatest emphasis should be placed on the "right
to control" factor, which is a sign that the hybrid test was being ap-
plied by the court. Unfortunately, the Lerohl court chose to apply the
Supreme Court's general rule to the more specific area of Title VII
cases despite the majority of Title VII cases applying the hybrid test.
If the hybrid test had been applied, there is a good chance that Ler-
ohl would have prevailed and the court would have found her to be an
employee. She would have prevailed because under the hybrid test,
the "right to control" factor is the most important factor.1 7 Conduc-
tor Fishman clearly had the right to control Lerohl and the Sinfonia
musicians' performances. Therefore, by applying greater weight to
112. The Supreme Court in the Darden case stated that the "general rule" followed in the
Reid case, namely "where Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under the
common law without defining it, the common law definition applies," stood as independent au-
thority for the decision in relation to claims under the Copyright Act. Then, the Court analyzed
whether the "general rule" applied to ERISA. National Mutual Ins. Co., v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318, 322-323. The Court made no statement about the applicability of the "general rule" to Title
VII claims.
113. See Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc. 673 F.2d 337, 341 (11th Cir. 1982); Fields v. Hallsville Inde-
pendent School Dist. 906 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1990); Wilde v. Country of Kandiyohi, 811 F.
Supp. 446, 451 (D. Minn. 1993); Mallare v. St. Luke's Hospital of Bethlehem, 699 F. Supp. 1127,
1129 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (applying hybrid test to determine whether physician was an employee.).
114. Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103 (8th Cir. 1994). This note provides reference
to both the lower District Court decision in the Wilde case (see Wilde, 81 F.Supp 446) and the
Court of Appeals decision.
115. Id. at 105 (citing Oestman v. National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 303, 305 (10th
Cir. 1992); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1985); Garrett v. Phillips Mills,
Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981-82 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37-38 (3d. Cir.
1983); Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340-41 (11th Cir.); Unger v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 915 n.8 (7th Cir. 1981); Lutcher v. Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880,
883 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1980); Spirides, 613 F.2d at 831-32.)
116. Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 114 (stating that "though
no single factor is dispositive, the "greatest emphasis" should be placed on the first factor-that
is, on the extent to which the hiring party controls the "manner and means" by which the worker
completes his or her assigned tasks.")..
117. Wilde, 811 F. Supp at 451 (stating that the extent of the employer's right to control the
worker is the most telling factor).
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the "right to control" that is proper under the hybrid test, Lerohl was
an employee of conductor Fishman and the Sinfonia under Title VII.
2. The Court's Emphasis of the "Right to Retain"
Factor Is Flawed
Further, the court mistakenly emphasized the "right to retain" fac-
tor in its analysis in the Lerohl case. 118 First, the court's emphasis on
the "right to retain" factor directly contradicts their statement that no
one factor is determinative.' 19
In addition, the court incorrectly concluded that the "right to re-
tain" factor favors the Sinfonia's position that the musicians were in-
dependent contractors. Although the musicians could technically turn
down work that was offered to them, such a decision would have a
clear adverse impact on their status as "regular" players. Conductor
Fishman's policy was that musicians must accept the vast majority of
the work to be considered "regular" or "first call" players. 120 There-
fore, if a Sinfonia musician turned down a job that was offered to him
or her, that musician might no longer be offered jobs in the future.
The court characterized this policy as merely an inducement.121 The
court seems to be saying that anything short of formally firing the em-
ployee for failure to accept work fails the "right to retain" factor of
employment status.
According to the Lerohl Court, the relevant control issue is not the
traditional "right to control" factor but the "right to retain" factor.1
22
However, the court did not provide any precedent for cases that have
considered the "right to retain" factor to be more important that the
"right to control" factor. The court merely stated that other courts
have found the "right to retain" factor to be relevant in determining
whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.1
23
Also, unlike the court's characterization of the "right to retain" factor
as being the relevant control issue, the "right to retain" factor is a
118. See Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 491.
119. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 489 (stating that "all of the incidents of the relationship must be
assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.").
120. Id. at 488. The court states, "to remain a Sinfonia regular, which ensures being invited to
play in most if not all Sinfonia concerts, Fishman's policy is that a musician must accept the vast
majority of the work." Id.
121. Id. at 492. The court stated, "though the Sinfonia understandably offered inducements to
preferred performers, such as "regular" status, the musicians retained control over the extent to
which they committed their available professional time to the Sinfonia."
122. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 491.
123. Id. at 491 (stating that "cases applying the common-law agency test have recognized this
freedom-of-choice principle in determining whether a skilled professional was an employee or
an independent contractor.")
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separate and distinct factor from the "right to control" factor.124
More specifically stated, the Reid Court described the "right to retain"
factor as "whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional
projects to the hired party.' 25 The Lerohl Court simply has no basis
for placing greater importance on the "right to retain" factor than on
the traditional "right to control" factor. Therefore, the Lerohl Court
was mistaken when it claimed that the relevant control issue is the
"right to retain" factor.
3. The Decision Went Against a Prior Determination Regarding
Symphony Musicians
The Lerohl decision is also flawed because it contradicts Seattle Op-
era v. NLRB, a prior employment status decision regarding symphony
musicians. 126 In Seattle Opera, the court held that auxiliary choristers
were employees of the Opera. 127 Similar to the freelance musicians in
the Lerohl case, the auxiliary choristers were chosen from a larger
pool of choristers to fill gaps in chorus when regulars were unavaila-
ble. 128 The Seattle Opera case involved a determination of employ-
ment status under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Although the NLRA's statutory definition of employee is more spe-
cific than Title VII's definition of employee, the relevant inquiry is
much the same. Under the NLRA, a person is an employee if he
works for a statutory employer in return for financial or other com-
pensation and the statutory employer has the power or "right to con-
trol" or direct the person in the material details of how such work is to
be performed. 129 There are several exemptions to this rule, one which
includes whether the worker is an independent contractor. 130 Not
124. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-752.
125. Id.
126. See generally Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
127. Id. at 761. The Court stated, "we must ask whether the Board's determination that auxil-
iaries are 'employees' under the Act has warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law. We
conclude that it does.
128. Id. at 759. The Seattle Opera had a pool of 100 to 200 auxiliary choristers who audition
before a musical committee. From the pool, the Opera selects up to 16 "alternate choristers" to
fill openings in the chorus. If a regular takes a leave of absence, his replacement is designated a
"temporary regular chorister."
129. Id. at 762.
130. Id. The statute reads, "The term "employee shall include any employee, and shall not be
limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states other-
wise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connec-
tion with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not
obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any
individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person
at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the
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only did the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) hold that the
auxiliary choristers are employees under the Act,131 but also that the
Seattle Opera did not even claim on appeal that the auxiliary choris-
ters fell into the independent contractor exemption.
132
Despite this, the Lerohl Court chose to side with the dissent in the
Seattle Opera case. 133 However, the Lerohl Court did not claim that
they agreed with the dissent that the auxiliary choristers were not em-
ployees. The court merely agreed with the dissent's attack of the
"right to control" factor.134 Since the Lerohl Court admitted that
there were few cases of this type dealing with musicians, they should
have used the majority's decision in Seattle Opera to aid them.135
Therefore, the Lerohl Court should have followed the Seattle Opera
Court's reasoning and held that the freelance musicians, like the auxil-
iary choristers, were employees.
4. The Reid Test Is Inappropriate for Title VII Claims
The Reid test is inappropriate for Title VII claims because it ignores
the broad scope of Title VII. The Reid and Darden cases applied to
different statutes than the Lerohl case, the work-for-hire provision of
the Copyright Act and ERISA, respectively. 136 Therefore, the deci-
sions applying to these statutes cannot be easily applied to Title VII
cases since policies vary between statutes.
For example, the work-for-hire provision of the Copyright Act,
137
which was the subject of the Reid decision, is vastly different than Ti-
tle VII. Under the work-for-hire provision, the employer is granted a
status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual
employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to time, or
by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined. 29 U.S.C § 152(3) (emphasis
added).
131. Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 759.
132. Id. at 762. The court stated that "the Opera does not claim that the auxiliaries fall within
any of the section 152(3)'s specific exemptions."
133. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 490.
134. Id. at 490 (stating that "on the control theory urged by Lerohl, Hanson, and the EEOC,
we find Judge Randolph's dissent more persuasive).
135. Id. at 490 (stating that "there are surprisingly few cases addressing whether musicians
who played in a band or orchestra were employees of either the entity that engaged the perform-
ance, or the musician's band leader or orchestra conductor.").
136. See generally Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); Na-
tionwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
137. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2003). A "work made for hire" is defined as (1) a work prepared by
an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or
commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an in-
structional text, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. Id.
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copyright in the work created by the employee even if the employer
did not add any significant creative input into the finished product. 138
The narrow Reid test of employee enunciated by the court is therefore
completely appropriate to the work-for-hire provision of the Copy-
right Act. It would do violence to the idea of granting a copyright,
which rewards authors with a monopoly right in a work as a means of
encouraging creative works, by allowing employers to gain a copyright
in a work that they did not create without significant safeguards. 139
The narrow Reid test helps to carry out this policy. However, these
concerns do not apply to Title VII claims in which the employer is
discriminating against the worker. Title VII is a broad and remedial
statute. Title VII's "strictures are absolute and represent a congres-
sional command that each employee be free from discriminatory prac-
tices.' 140 Therefore, the narrow Reid test is inappropriate to the
problem of discrimination covered under Title VII.
• Further, the policy of respondent superior from which the common
law and Reid tests were based is vastly different from the policy of
Title VII. Unlike the doctrine of respondent superior, Title VII en-
courages the expansion of employer liability.141 The doctrine of re-
spondent superior works to hold an employer liable for the actions of
his employees. 142 Therefore, the employer is being held accountable
for the actions of another. A narrow definition of employee is correct
for the doctrine of respondent superior since it would be unfair to
hold an individual liable for the actions of a person he or she had
minimal contact with. 43 On the other hand, under Title VII cases, the
138. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(b). "In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of
the rights comprised in the copyright." Id.
139. "The Supreme Court has observed that the promotion of the arts and sciences is the
primary purpose of the monopoly granted to copyright owners." ROCHELL C. DREYFUSS &
ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT AND PATENT LAW (Foundation Press
1996) (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1023 (1994); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).)
140. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974); Dowd, The Test of Employee
Status, 26 WNm. & MARY L. REV. at 87 (stating that "the prohibitions against employment dis-
crimination contained in Title VII are sweeping, and presume an equally expansive definition in
order to achieve the statute's goals.").
141. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 102.
142. Id. at 98 (stating the "if done by a servant.., and acting within the scope of his author-
ity... the maxim respondent superior is adopted in that case.").
143. See Id. at 101 (stating that "the right to control has remained the cornerstone of the
common law test of employee status, reflecting a perception of fairness and sound public policy
that employers should be held vicariously liable for the acts of employees only when the em-
ployer has the means to control that liability.").
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employer is being held accountable for the employer's own actions.
In a Title VII case, the employer is accused of actively discriminating
against a worker. The narrow definition of employee developed
under the doctrine of Respondent Superior is therefore inappropriate
for Title VII claims. 144 Courts have failed to analyze whether the
common-law test is compatible with the policies behind Title VII.14
5
The common-law test was designed "as a shield to protect employers
from unwarranted tort liability, not as a weapon to ensure employee
rights." 146
5. The Reid Factors Are Unfair When Applied
to Symphony Musicians
Finally, some of the Reid factors are unfair when applied to sym-
phony musicians and other employees.147 First, one of the Reid fac-
tors is the level of skill of the worker. 148 If a worker is considered
highly skilled, it points toward a finding that a person is not an em-
ployee but an independent contractor. It seems unfair to penalize an
employee for being highly skilled. Highly skilled employees spend
years and sometimes decades on perfecting their craft. Therefore, it is
particularly nonsensical to keep highly skilled workers from seeking
redress from an employer who has lessened their career or employ-
ment opportunities via discrimination.
Other Reid factors that the Lerohl Court used against Lerohl was
the fact that the Sinfonia did not withhold FICA taxes for its Sinfonia
musicians or provide significant benefits. 149 Under the Reid case, tax
treatment of the worker and benefits received are considered relevant
factors in determining'whether the worker is an employee. 150 How-
ever, earlier Title VII decisions have pointed out that courts should
not place too great a weight upon how a worker is treated for tax
purposes or whether the worker receives benefits.' 5 1 For example, in
144. See Dowd, The Test of Employee Status, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 101 (stating "these
policy considerations are fundamentally different from those that underlie the common law test
of employee status limiting an employer's vicarious liability. The policy underlying Title VII
encourages the expansion of employer liability to encompass all conduct that deprives individu-
als of employment opportunities on the basis of race, sex, religion or national origin.").
145. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM &
MARY L. REV. 75, 95 (1984).
146. Id.
147. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
148. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-752.
149. Lerohl, 322 F.3d at 492.
150. Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-752.
151. Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111, 115-116 (2d Cir. 2000)
(stating that tax treatment and benefits should not be given extra weight).
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Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc.,152 the court stated
that if Reid's tax and benefit factors were given too much weight,
firms would simply devise compensation packages that include a
"nobenefits (sic) clause and a no-tax-deductions clause, thereby all
but insuring that the workers are characterized as independent con-
tractors. ' 153 Therefore, technical considerations like benefits and
treatment under the Internal Revenue Code should not play an im-
portant role in determining employment status considering the broad
remedial purpose of Title VII.
In addition, applying the Reid factors to symphony musicians leads
to unfair results due to the nature of work as a musician. For exam-
ple, a large part of a symphony musician's time is spent practicing.
Most musicians practice 2 to 3 hours per day. Therefore, a typical
employment situation one would find in most professions is not possi-
ble. Most professionals do not spend a large part of their day honing
and maintaining their skills. The majority of professionals merely em-
ploy their skills throughout their workday. Further, employment in
symphony orchestras is usually only one of the jobs that symphony
musicians take. Most musicians teach or give lessons as another
source of income. Only the most financially successful of musicians
can earn a living merely on performances alone. Therefore, it is unfair
to penalize Lerohl and other freelance musicians for choosing not to
formally join another symphony orchestra that offers permanent
employment.
B. The Decision in Lerohl Was Correct in Some Respects
Despite the fact that the Lerohl Court mistakenly applied the Reid
test to a Title VII claim, the court's decision appropriately pointed out
the weaknesses in some of the factors of the test. For example, the
court criticized the "right to control" factor by citing to the dissenting
opinion in the Seattle Opera case. 154 The dissenting opinion in Seattle
Opera questioned "are we to suppose that volunteer firefighters or
volunteer rescue workers become employees because the fire chief or
the head of the rescue squad directs them?"'155
Although the "right to control" was the correct factor to apply in
the Lerohl case, such examples as that mentioned by the dissent in
Seattle Opera show that application of the factors can lead to incorrect
152. See generally Eisenberg, 237 F.3d 111.
153. Id. at 117.
154. Lerohl, 332 F.3d at 490-491.
155. Id. at 491.
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results.' 56 As mentioned earlier, some of the factors such as "level of
skill of the worker" and "tax treatment" can lead to unfair results for
workers like symphony musicians. Therefore, perhaps a broader test
for determining coverage under Title VII needs to be developed.
V. IMPACT
The decision in Lerohl continues the mistake made by some courts
by applying the Reid test to all cases involving employee status deter-
minations even though the cases apply to different statutes. However,
there are some that argue that all of the tests of employment status
differ only mildly from each other.157 Despite the differences between
the tests as stated by the courts, the various tests are often applied in
identical ways. Further, all of the tests have the potential result of
denying coverage to someone who has genuinely been discriminated
against in an employment setting.
There is an increasing debate among scholars as to whether a new
test for determining whether a worker is an employee 158 is really the
answer to the inequities in the current system.159 One of the most
interesting ideas for solving the problem is to amend Title VII to in-
clude independent contractors.160 This note will argue that amending
156. See Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26
WM & MARY L. REV. 75, 85-86 (1984) (stating that the factor analysis is "unduly simplistic"
because "this analysis excludes workers from Title VII not on the basis of the realities of their
interaction with employers, but rather upon the existence or nonexistence of a limited set of
factors.").
157. Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities": The Case for
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38
B.C. L. REV. 239, 254 (1997) (stating that there appears to be only "minor distinctions" among
the tests).
158. See Dowd, The Test of Employee Status, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 113-114 for an
example of a proposed test for determining whether a worker is an "employee." The author
states, "among the considerations that might be examined are the structure and nature of the
employer's business; hiring, promotion and termination procedures; the structure of compensa-
tion and standards of performance; referral to and control of the employment market; and the
degree of integration of the worker in the employer's business. Other relevant factors are
whether the worker is hired for a particular skill, or is unskilled or trained by the employer;
whether the worker can hire others to perform the work without the employer's approval; and
whether the worker provides equipment or other resources to perform the work. The means and
methods of performance are relevant not to determine the employer's control over the physical
conduct of the worker, but rather to analyze the relative power and bargaining position of the
employer and the worker so as to determine the potential for employment discrimination." Id;
See also Yamada, 38 B.C. L. REV. at 259-266 (detailing the various proposals that have been
offered for clearing up the determination of employment status issue).
159. Id. at 240. The authors of this article feel that despite its popularity among some, the
"economic realities" test is not the best solution.
160. See generally Yamada, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239 for a thorough analysis of the issue.
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Title VII to include independent contractors is the best solution to the
problem.
First, the amount of independent contractors in the workforce is
ever increasing. 161 Less secure job arrangements are starting to take
over the traditional blue collar and white collar employment pat-
terns.' 62 Therefore, under the current system, more workers are left
without a remedy if discriminated against in the employment setting.
The legislature should be mindful of trends in the make-up of the
workforce in meeting the purposes of federal employment discrimina-
tion statutes. Protecting independent contractors will most effectively
serve the broad purpose of Title VII, which is protecting the largest
possible number of workers. There is simply no good reason for ex-
cluding independent contractors from coverage under Title VII when
the purpose of Title VII is to prevent discrimination in the workplace.
According to some commentators, "anyone in the zone of interest of
the statute who suffers either economic or non-economic injury be-
cause of employment discrimination" should be included in Title
VII.163 The fact that independent contractors make up an increasingly
large part of the workforce makes it even more necessary to protect
them under Title VII. Faced with the current realities regarding inde-
pendent contractors in the workforce, the expansion of Title VII to
cover independent contractors best serves the intention of Title VII:
ensuring the broadest possible reach to Title VII's prohibitions in the
hopes of eliminating employment discrimination. 64
Additionally, amending Title VII to protect independent contrac-
tors will remove the incentive for employers to classify workers as in-
dependent contractors to evade discrimination claims.1 65 Employers
are sometimes able to avoid Title VII coverage by specifying the terms
and conditions of jobs in such a way that the worker will be classified
as an independent contractor. 166 The Reid and common-law tests fail
to "consider the employee's perspective of the relationship and the
employer's ability to manipulate access to employment opportunities
and to control the terms and conditions of employment.' ' 167 Actual
161. Id. at 243 (noting a survey in which 6.7 percent of the total work force identified them-
selves as independent contractors).
162. Id. at 245.
163. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 88.
164. Id. at 89.
165. Yamada, 38 B.C. L. REV. at 266.
166. Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM &
MARY L. REV. 75, 85 (1984) (stating that "the emphasis on form over substance also permits
employers to avoid Title VII coverage simply by following a particular pattern when establishing
the terms and conditions of specific jobs.").
167. Id. at 86.
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employees can be "misclassified" as independent contractors. 168 As a
result, they will loss their protections under Title VII.169
It must be noted that covering independent contractors under Title
VII does not damage the traditional definition and understanding of
the place of an independent contractor in the workforce. Further, the
traditional legal relationship between an employer and an indepen-
dent contractor will remain the same, except in the case where an in-
dependent contractor has been discriminated against by the employer.
Further, including coverage to independent contractors will lead to
a decrease in litigation.170 Litigating whether a worker fits the techni-
cal definition of employee will no longer be necessary. Instead, inde-
pendent contractors will have the full range of arguments afforded to
traditional workers under Title VII. Also, litigation regarding the nu-
merous Reid factors will be unnecessary if independent contractors
are included under Title VII. This solution will eliminate the factor
tests that sometimes unfairly classify certain workers just on the basis
of the subtleties of their profession.
It should be noted -that this solution should only be applied to Title
VII. Other statutes must be independently analyzed to determine
whether including independent contractors best suits the purposes of
the statutes. In the case of Title VII, it is clear that covering indepen-
dent contractors best serves its broad remedial purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION
The policy behind Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, protect-
ing workers from discrimination, has not been well served by decisions
like Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia. Courts continue to rely
on an overly narrow definition of "employee" in determining whether
an individual is covered under Title VII. This definition has the effect
of denying relief to many workers who have been discriminated
against during their professional careers. Courts need to develop a
broader test for determining if a worker is covered under Title VII in
order to accommodate the broad purpose of Title VII. Further, the
continuing practice of denying coverage under Title VII to people
characterized as independent contractors is nonsensical since indepen-
dent contractors can also suffer from employment discrimination and
should have a proper remedy. Therefore, the legislature should
amend Title VII to extend coverage to independent contractors. Such
168. Yamada, 38 B.C. L. REV. at 243.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 266.
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measures are necessary to alleviate the current inequities in the ad-
ministration of Title VII.
